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T

he demand for more and better procedural fairness is a rallying-cry
that receives almost universal support. All participants in the legal
process – litigants, judges, legislators and lawyers – maintain that
the justice of any outcome can be both affected by the quality of the
procedures relied upon and offset by the failure to provide access to
appropriate and balanced procedural opportunities. Indeed, unless losing
litigants or applicants think that they are getting a fair shake when it
comes to the procedures used, there will be even greater dissatisfaction
with losing than otherwise might be the case. However, while good or fair
procedures will not guarantee satisfaction, let alone fair decisions, they will
go some of the way to placating people’s sense of dissatisfaction.1 As such,
in a complex and disputatious society like Canada, there seems to be more
agreement, although far from unanimous, on what might count as a fair
procedure than on what would be treated as a fair result. This explains the
attention that lawyers and judges pay to the fairness of different
procedures in different areas of dispute. Getting procedure right obviates
the more thorny challenge of getting substance right.
In this reflective provocation, I want to explore a little more critically
the whole idea and practice of procedural fairness. Although there is
ample rhetoric on the importance and nature of procedural fairness across
*
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the legal landscape and by its various protagonists, there is little attention
paid to the unevenness and availability of the actual procedures
recommended and institutionalized. One way to come at this issue is to
compare and contrast how procedural fairness is treated in the
jurisprudence on civil procedure and on administrative law; commentators
and judges are too easily blinded to the benefits of such a comparative
analysis. Despite a shared commitment to procedural farness and its ideal
centrality to each, there are some glaring inconsistencies between how civil
procedure and administrative law operationalize this critical idea. The
basic thrust of my critique, as this essay’s title suggests, is that civil
procedure comes a poor second to administrative law in its willingness to
take seriously and implement a basic structure and doctrine of procedural
fairness. Although administrative law in practice is far from perfect, it
seems to have an edge over the practice of civil procedure. There is much
in this to ponder and change because, to paraphrase Lon Fuller,2 if we get
things wrong procedurally, we are much less likely to get things right
substantively.

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
It seems axiomatic that the amount and quality of procedure that a
person is entitled to will vary depending on the dispute and its informing
context. As a rule of thumb, the more serious and weighty the dispute and
the consequences of its resolution, the more procedural options and
opportunities a person can expect to receive. There is no one set of
procedural entitlements that can be offered or resorted to in any formulaic
or absolutist way. As with so many other things, there will need to be a
balancing of factors and considerations – rights, resources, expectations,
reliances, remedies, consequences, etc. – to achieve, as the Ontario Rules
of Civil Procedure put it, “the just, most expeditious and least expensive
determination of every civil proceeding on its merits.”3 In particular, the
central challenge will be how to trade-off and square these four vital
2
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dimensions of procedural fairness – the justice of outcomes reached, the
time spent litigating, the funds invested in litigating, and resolution on the
merits of the dispute. As is often the case, there is no tried-and-true basis
on which to address and meet that conundrum. Unfortunately, nor is
there any consensus about how to go about doing that.
The judges and jurists who deal with civil procedure matters too often
get lost in the doctrinal and interpretive details; there is little reflection on
the overall scheme and objectives of the civil justice system. However,
administrative lawyers and judges have devoted considerable time and
attention to developing a broad matrix within which this balancing task
can be approached and answered; they have grappled with not only what is
meant by the principles of procedural fairness generally, but also what is
the better way to operationalize those principles across the vast spectrum
of different administrative tribunals, decision-making, and institutional
contexts. As was said by Justice Le Dain in Cardinal in 1985, “the right to a
fair hearing must be regarded as an independent, unqualified right which
finds its essential justification in the sense of procedural justice which any
person affected by an administrative decision is entitled to have.”4
Although there is still much work to be done within administrative law,
the basic framework is in play; it is now as much about its more detailed
elaboration, practical orientation and doctrinal fine-tuning as anything
else.5
The key and most expansive judgment on procedural fairness remains
that of the Supreme Court in 1999 in Baker.6 In regard to a deportation
case, the Court took the occasion to lay out a two-part approach to
procedural fairness; the duty and the content. First, the Court explained
how the context of any particular case or hearing would be determinative
in deciding the degree of flexibility that would be allowed in shaping the
particular application of a fair procedure. In particular, the Court laid
down five factors that should be considered: (1) the nature of the decision;
(2) the nature of the statutory scheme; (3) the importance of the decision
4
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to the affected person; (4) the presence of any legitimate expectations; and
(5) the choice of procedure made by the decision-maker. These
considerations are not intended to be exhaustive and they are not meant
to be in any order of priority. The idea was that different levels of
procedure made available would be calibrated in line with these factors.
So, while one situation might demand a full and trial-like process with all
the bells and whistles associated with such occasions, another situation
might warrant a more relaxed, informal and lesser set of procedural
avenues. The court has encouraged tribunals and adjudicators to adopt a
suitably pragmatic mentality in modelling this adaptable sliding-scale in
fulfilling their administrative mandate.
In the second part of Baker, in its judgment on content, the Court
outlined what is meant by treating a litigant or applicant in a procedurally
fair way. It emphasized that individuals should have the opportunity to
present their case fully and fairly; that any decision affecting their rights,
interests, or privileges should be the product of using a fair, impartial and
open process; and that the statutory, institutional and social context of the
decisions should be considered. As such, the Court introduced a level and
content of procedural fairness that left little doubt that the government
had an obligation in the creation, establishment, operation, and
populating of tribunals that, even if courts might be willing to defer on
matters of substance, they would insist that the basic tenets of procedural
justice should be closely followed and respected.
Over the past two decades, the courts have begun to flesh out what the
duty of procedural fairness demands in terms of its content and
parameters. In general, there has been an acknowledgment that
participation alone is insufficient and that meaningful participation is
required.7 As such, although still based on and derived from the two key
principles of the right to be heard (audi alteram partem) and lack of bias
(nemo iudex in sua causa), they have been deepened and broadened to
include a range of sub-principles that include:
• right to notice – there should be no surprises or ambushes;
7
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•

right to a hearing – there should be an open and public setting for
decision-making;
• right to make submissions – there should be opportunities to
participate meaningfully;
• right to counsel – there should be the possibility of professional
advocacy and help;
• right to cross-examine – there should be the chance to challenge
witnesses and evidence;
• right to reasons – there should be reasonable explanation given for
any decision made.
Taken together these requirements, while admittedly applied and
adjusted in a loose and selective situation-specific manner, amount to a
relatively rich and detailed account of procedural fairness. Although the
Supreme Court has managed to tie itself in knots over the standard for
review,8 it has been consistent and concerted in its efforts to give the right
to a fair hearing in administrative law some real substance and bite. It has,
in a manner of speaking, been prepared to put its doctrinal money where
its principled mouth is. Of course, while there are some encouraging signs,
whether these statements of law have reaped practical rewards in the actual
and quotidian operation of administrative tribunals and decision-making
remains a largely open question: the practice often fails to live up to the
theory. Having said that, the extent and sophistication of judicial efforts to
take seriously procedural fairness in administrative law stands in sharp
contrast with similar efforts in civil procedure.

FORMAL SLIPS
When it comes to civil actions, the applicable Rules offer a wide range
of procedural devices and openings to ensure that the best effort is made
to facilitate a fair and just result for actions brought. Many of the features
of procedural fairness are incorporated into the Rules so as to enable
litigants, both plaintiffs and defendants, to have the fairest and most
conducive means through which to resolve their dispute and obtain
substantive justice. By way of comparison to administrative law, the Rules
provide crafted solutions to notice-giving, disclosure, timeliness,
8
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participation, order, evidence-presentation, cross-examination, motions,
and the like; the limits to these procedural mechanisms are as important
as their original design and purpose. Different levels of procedure are
available for different disputes and venues; the amount in dispute is often
the decisive criterion. However, the Rules seem to have taken on a very
technical life of their own: they have become the framework for a
sophisticated and distracting game of litigational cat-and-mouse. Apart
from occasional exhortations to act expeditiously and fairly, there is little
of an underlying theory or philosophy of procedural fairness that animates
and guides their application in civil actions.
As far as the courts’ Rules jurisprudence is concerned, there is no
overarching or developed account of procedural justice in civil procedure.9
There are judicial snippets here and there, but the basic view seems to be
that the Rules of Civil Procedure set out the general framework and there
is no need for such an elaboration: the role of the courts is often restricted
to discrete, technical and narrow acts of statutory interpretation.
Moreover, even in pursuing this limited and self-imposed task, the courts
have worked by and large in a formalistic and unimaginative way. There
are very few instances in which judges have taken the opportunity to
recommend or develop a more integrated account of what procedural
fairness is and how it might be put into play in civil actions. This
shortcoming is especially apparent when civil procedure is compared to
the dense doctrine that has been assembled in administrative law. The
judge has considerable discretion under the Rules to construe the Rules
liberally so as to achieve just outcomes.10
However, when the courts have taken a less cramped and more
expansive approach to procedural fairness, the focus and product has been
less than encouraging. Indeed, the stance taken runs almost opposite to
that of a Baker-like doctrine in administrative law. A strong and recent
9
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example of this is the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Hryniak.
The case was about the role and responsibilities of judges in hearing
motions for summary judgment – could and should they take a more
active role and make decisive findings that will dispose of actions at a
relatively early stage in the proceedings? The traditional approach had
been that judges should only grant such motions where there was no
genuine issue for trial and there were no significant issues of credibility.
The rationale was that litigants should only have their right to a fair trial
curtailed and denied in the most compelling of circumstances. The
Hryniak decision changed all that.
The case involved a fraud action in which the defendant Hryniak had
allegedly and fraudulently induced some people to invest in a dubious offshore investment opportunity. The plaintiffs brought a motion for
summary judgment. The judge utilised powers under Ontario’s Rule 20 to
hear and weigh evidence, test Hryniak’s credibility, and make factual
findings. He decided that a trial was not required and Hryniak had
committed the tort of fraud. The Supreme Court approved of this way of
proceeding. On behalf of the Court, although she emphasized that the
apparent need to maintain timely and uncompromised procedural farness,
Justice Karakatsanis contended that “undue process and protracted trials,
with unnecessary expense and delay, can prevent the fair and just
resolution of disputes.”11 Encouraging the use of alternative processes
instead of full trials to resolve cases, she considered that a proportionate
and working balance should be struck between full access to courts and
the costs and dilatoriness of such access: “the proportionality principle
means that the best forum for resolving a dispute is not always that with
the most painstaking procedure.”12
While it would be foolish to pretend that time and money were not
important factors to be weighed in the balance of justice, it is surely
throwing out the baby with the bathwater to deny litigants (against whom
judgment is given) a right to a hearing without all the usual protections
and procedures of a conventional trial: the truncated and narrow
opportunity afforded by a motion is not always adequate. Indeed, the
11

Hryniak v Mauldin, [2014] 1 SCR 8 at para 24 [Hryniak]. For a strong analysis, see
Barbara Billingsley, “Hryniak v. Mauldin Comes To Alberta: Summary Judgment,
Culture Shift, And The Future Of Civil Trials,” (2017) 55:1 Alta L Rev 1.

12

Hryniak, ibid at para 28. On the powerful impact of costs and fees, see infra pp.

48 MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL | VOLUME 43 ISSUE 2
thrust of Justice Karakatsanis’s argument is that the connection between
procedural fairness and merits-based adjudication is weak and that the full
right to be heard is not always the gold standard of procedural fairness. In
contrast to the rigorous arguments in favour of procedural fairness in
administrative law, the Supreme Court in Hryniak seemed to be almost
cavalier in its regard to its importance in civil actions. For Justice
Karakatsanis, time and costs were the guiding lights of her analysis, not
procedural fairness as a valuable and valued end in itself.
Indeed, in an early pre-Baker administrative law case in 1985, the
Supreme Court took the strong line that the values of procedural fairness
should not be traded off against utilitarian concerns (e.g., the costs of
providing such fair procedures). Justice Wilson held that:
No doubt considerable time and money can be saved by adopting administrative
procedures which ignore the principles of fundamental justice but such an
argument, in my view, misses the point…. The principles of natural justice and
procedural fairness which have long been espoused by our courts implicitly
recognize that a balance of administrative convenience does not override the
need to adhere to these principles.13

In most administrative law contexts, of course, these resources will be
those of the government; they are providing the institutions and personnel
of administration. In civil actions, while the government underwrites the
costs of courts and judges, the main sources of expense and funding lie
with the litigants; the primary and largest cost is for lawyers’ services and
fees. This is no small difference. Nevertheless, except in circumstances
where there is a frivolous and vexatious claim being made, it seems wrongheaded to relegate procedural fairness to a second-level consideration.
Justice Karakatsanis’s insistence that “the best forum for resolving a
dispute is not always that with the most painstaking procedure”14 seems to
13
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run counter to the basic rationale behind the need for procedural fairness
– that fair procedures will more likely lead to fairer results. While not all
cases need to be given the first-class treatment that the Rules would confer
and recommend, it is a large step to relegating procedural fairness to an
also-ran in the journey to substantive justice.
After all, access to civil justice is heavily constrained by the costliness
and dilatoriness of the process. If this is to be improved, these features
must be tackled directly. The Hryniak approach is more about responding
to and reducing the harm caused by such problems; it does not address or
focus on the causes of that harm – the civil process is breaking under its
own costly weight and that load needs to be significantly lightened.
Judicial measures to tackle costliness and dilatoriness must be taken. It is
insufficient that judges, like Justice Karakatsanis and her colleagues, are
simply content to adjust other components of the process, like summary
judgment, to accommodate the costly and delayed nature of the civil
process. As such, constraining even further the quality of procedural
fairness is not the way to go. While justice delayed is a genuine problem
that can lead to justice being denied, it is also true that justice rushed and
reduced can also lead to justice being denied. Hryniak turns many litigants
into hostages of systemic fortune.

INFORMAL EFFECTS
Of course, the fact that the whole process of procedural justice is
governed by broad utilitarian and economic concerns, as reflected in
Hryniak, should come as no surprise to seasoned participants in the civil
justice process. Although judges and lawyers insist that justice is not for
sale, any reasonable observer would be hard pressed to disagree that the
costs of justice are often the main determinants of its availability and
distribution. Although Ontario’s Rule 1.04 lists justness, expeditiousness
and merit-based determination as leading factors, it is the expense factor
that drives the process. Indeed, the formal scheme of civil justice is
underpinned and dominated by the informal scheme of economic
dynamics in which civil justice becomes a negotiable commodity.
Unfortunately, to paraphrase the great William Blake, ‘the price of
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fairness can be bought for a song or dance in the street’.15 As such, the
song-and-dance of the civil process is an expensive gambol (and gamble)
that comes at a high price that few can afford and with high costs that
many cannot.
In any system, including the administrative process, there will be
economic expenses. There is usually a set of fees for initiating the process
and filing documents in both administrative and litigation schemes.
Fortunately, the courts have been relatively conscientious in ensuring that
these are kept to a minimum and not exploited by government as a source
of revenue.16 However, it is the costs of lawyers that consumes most of
people’s budgets. Lawyers’ fees are high (an average of at least $350-400 per
hour in Toronto). In both the administrative and litigation context, these
amounts can soon become prohibitive for most people; a trial can easily
cost $50,000. This situation in only exacerbated by a set of costs rules that
are generally based upon the notion of fault – the loser is to pay a
significant portion of the winner’s costs. The effects of these costs rules are
hardly conducive to encouraging notions of procedural fairness. Whatever
the original rationales for a fee-shifting regime (that is, deterring frivolous
cases, settling disputes, and broader access), these are no longer viable.
Too often, litigation costs are out of all proportion to the value of most
disputed matters. This is not helped by the unpredictability of costs
awards. As a result, procedural costs are the real driver of litigation, not
the resolution of substantive disputes.17
In the civil justice system, a basic force of the loser-pays cost system is
that the mutual costs of litigation will almost always exceed those of
settlement. This means that it is reasonable to expect that it will nearly
always be in the best interests of the parties to settle their dispute rather
15
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than litigate. Although this is by no means a bad thing, it is a somewhat
perverse system of procedural justice that creates powerful incentives not
to use it. Moreover, the predominant costs rule exacerbates the already
harsh consequences of the all-or-nothing character of litigation. While it
may serve to discourage frivolous litigation, the costs rule may result in
meritorious and novel claims not being pursued or pressed. Also, a litigant
stands to receive more when successful, but to lose more when
unsuccessful. This fact has considerable effect upon the parties' attitudes
to risk; there will be a greater variance of returns between winning and
losing. Mindful that most litigants tend to be risk-averse, this greater
variance will encourage more litigants to settle (or, more accurately, bring
their claim to a close) than litigate. Again, the primary emphasis is on
utilizing costs as a way of avoiding litigation. This can only work to
disadvantage poorer litigants who will be under enormous pressure to
settle as the costs of losing are so high.
By way of example, if P sues D for $100,000 (and both parties think
that they have an equal chance of success), the deciding factor will likely be
the costs. Assuming costs of about $25,000 each (and this is very low for
any kind of trial) and a 50% indemnity of the costs to the winning party,
the variance for P will be +$87,500 for a win (i.e., $100,000 less 50% of
their own costs of $25,000) and -$37,500 (their own cost of $25,000 and
$12,500 of D). This means that P has to be prepared to lose $37,500 (as
well as not getting their $100,000) in order to gain $87,500. For poorer
and more risk-averse litigants, this does not seem to be a very sensible
gamble; they likely do not have a further $37,500 to lose. Also, the
possibility of indemnifying at a rate of more than 50% is a daunting
prospect.18 Moreover, if D is a corporation or richer litigant (who can
afford to be much less risk-averse), P will be in an even tighter spot. All in
all, civil justice seems to resemble more of a game of roulette in which the
house or wealthy defendant has the odds very much in their favour. This
does not encourage confidence that the system is devoted to or even
interested in achieving substantive justice, let alone providing procedural
fairness.

18

While partial indemnity is the standard cost award, substantial indemnity can be
ordered in certain circumstances. See Rules, supra note 3, R 57. If this did occur at
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For instance, while the right to a hearing is front-and-centre in the
administrative jurisprudence (even if not always available in all
circumstances), this entitlement is simply beyond the realistic reach or
expectation of the ordinary litigant in the civil justice system. Although
much of the Rules is based on the assumption that there ultimately will be
a trial, this is simply not a viable prospect or likelihood for most litigants
in the civil justice system. Unlike their administrative counterparts,
litigants do not get the valued experience of making their case before an
impartial adjudicator. This is not because the stakes are too low in
litigation or that the matters involved are not serious or weighty enough
(e.g., custody disputes or home re-possessions), but because the system is
constantly pressurising litigants to bring their dispute to an early
conclusion, often without regard to the merits or justice if the situation.
In doing this, the main ambition of the civil justice system is to
terminate rather than resolve disputes; a system-wide quantitative measure
takes precedence over an individualised qualitative evaluation. All of this
is thrown into even sharper and more pessimistic relief when it is
appreciated that more and more litigants do not have lawyers, but are selfrepresented. In recent years, it is estimated that over 60% (and rising) of
litigants are trying to make their own way through a system that is
designed to be populated and utilised by legal professionals. 19 It is a major
flaw of the civil justice system and of the lawyering process generally that it
assumes most participants have lawyers when they do not. The challenge is
not simply to make the procedural structure more welcoming to nonlawyers, but to re-design the whole process so that it is usable by the bulk
of its self-represented participants. Without such a transformative shift (of
a different kind than that recommended by Justice Karakatsanis in
Hryniak), any notion that procedural fairness is taken seriously within civil
litigation is simply so much smoke and mirrors. If the courts lived up to
their own administrative law pronouncement that “the denial of a right to
a fair hearing must always render a decision invalid”20 in the civil justice
system, then almost all litigants would have a case for having adverse
judgments set aside.

19

See Jennifer Leitch, “Lawyers and Self-Represented Litigants: A n Ethical Change of
Role?” (2017) 95:3 Can Bar Rev 669.
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Cardinal, supra note 4 at para 23.
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In contrast to civil litigation, the courts in administrative proceedings
have been prepared on occasion to order state-funded counsel; this is not a
common situation and only occurs where the applicant’s interest are
serious and weighty.21 They have also been prepared to order that filing
fees and the like be set aside in cases of hardship. As regards the costs rules
in play in the administrative process, they are much less draconian and, if
not user-friendly, then at least not too paralyzing for applicants of modest
or even middle-class means. As with most things administrative, the
enabling statute usually lays out a framework for paying and recovering
costs; this might occasionally allow for a losing party to pay the tribunal’s
costs. For instance, before the Landlord and Tenant Board, lawyers’ fees
are usually only awarded if there has been unreasonable conduct by the
other party. Also, the amount awarded is often limited to the time spent at
the hearing; preparation time is restricted to cases of unreasonable
conduct. Finally, an order for a losing party to pay another party’s fees and
the Board's costs is only made in very exceptional circumstances.
The effect of these rules and regulations in the administrative process
is that costs awards, unlike in civil litigation, are not regularly used or have
the effect of depriving people of their right to a hearing or pressuring them
to settle, whatever the fairness of the settlement. There seems to be a
much greater willingness to limit the award and use of fees to deterring
and curbing of unreasonable behaviour; they are not deployed as a chilling
device, but as compensatory measures. Indeed, the whole force of the rules
in the administrative process are more sensibly attuned to allowing people
to exercise their rights, not to contain them. As such, the informal
dynamics of economic pricing do not drive and occasionally subvert the
formal scheme of justice as they do in civil litigation. In short, it is more
about inherent fairness than it is about utilitarian calculations. Civil
litigation has much to learn from administrative law.

CONCLUSION
The upshot of all this is that the system of civil procedure fails short of
any reasonable standard or expectation of procedural fairness. The core
problem in civil procedure is that ‘the best has become the enemy of the
good’. The procedural justice instantiated by the Rules is an extensive and
21
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thorough elaboration of what a close-to-ideal system might look like.
However, the problem is that only the privileged few (e.g., the rich and
corporations) can afford full access to it: everyone else is very much on the
outside looking in. There is little point in having a Lamborghini in the
garage if no one can afford to drive it and people have little money to live
after keeping such an extravagant machine in working order. As
administrative law indicates, the government must become a more
significant guarantor of the civil justice system if it is to function and be
available in a way that allows more, not less people to avail themselves of
it. De jure civil justice cannot simply be a glossy wrapping on a de facto
package that offers little or no procedural fairness to the great majority of
people.
When talking about the administrative process, Lorne Sossin
summed it best when he said that, in terms of procedural justice, “fairness
always matters, but what matters most is not always fairness.”22 This
assessment is doubly applicable to civil procedure; what matters most
seems to be the termination and reduction in litigation, not its fair
resolution. It is not only the Rules and their practical operation that take
such a stance, but the courts and judges themselves. As the Supreme
Court in Hryniak confirmed, due process and fair procedures are
something that can be set to the side or, at least, placed a distant second in
evaluating and implementing a procedural process that is supposed to be
fair. There seems to be little concern for offering a set of procedural rights
to litigants that have worth and value in themselves and that actually
matter in the daily practice of civil procedure. This is, to say the least, an
unfortunate turn of events in civil actions – the institutional promise of
procedural fairness remains a relatively empty and unfulfilled pledge.
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